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Memorandum for:

The attached briefing paper was requested by Ty Cobb, NSC. It covers the background and prospects of the Italian Communist Party (PCI).

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	The Italian Communist Party	
Ι.	How Powerful are the Italian Communists?	
West betw poin with next	The Italian Communist Party (PCI) is the largest Communist Party in ern Europe. The parliamentary elections last June, which saw the gap een the Christian Democrats and the PCI narrow to about 3 percentage ts in the Chamber of Deputies and in the Senate, has left the Communists in striking distance of becoming the largest party in the country when th national election takes place. With 30 percent of the vote, it is the nd largest party in Italy.	
	PCI support is not limited to blue collar workers. It also draws substantial support from the upper and middle classes.	•
	The Communists have established a significant presence nearly everywhere in Italy. They are strongest, however, in the urban areas of the center and northwest of the country.	
II.	The Communist Position Today	
	The Christian Democrats lost more than 5 percentage points in the elections last June, a landslide defeat by Italian standards.	
	The election results have made it mathematically possible for the first time for the Communists and smaller parties to form a government without the Christian Democrats.	
	This is not very likely at the moment because of the rivalry betwee the Socialists and the Communists and the suspicion with which Communist leader Enrico Berlinguer and Socialist leader Bettino Craxi regard each other.	n 2
hint	Some Christian Democrats appear to be interested in the possibility of an arrangement wit Communists. Some Communist and Christian Democratic politicians have ed publicly at interest in a possible deal, and there have been secret exploratory talks between left-wing Christian crats and Communist leaders. The DC politicians presumably have in mind	h .
some gove in w	thing which would fall short of actual Communist participaton in the rnment. They may view the so-called "historic compromise" of 1976-1979, hich the Communists traded their support for Christian Democratic-led rnments for concessions on social and economic issues, as a possible	
mode		•
Comm	The prospects for a deal between the Christian Democrats and the unists in the near future also appear remote.	
	Left-wing Christian Democrats know that this could cause a split with anti-Communist factions within their party.	
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Communist leader Berlinguer could also have trouble selling a deal many Communists feel they were double-crossed and put off with promises during the period of the "historic compromise." Nevertheless, the prospect of a deal between the Christian Democrats and the Communists cannot be totally disregarded. Many Christian Democrats and Communists can agree on one thing their dislike for Socialist leader Craxi.	25X1
He is in many ways a more dangerous political rival to both parties than they are to each other because his party is in a position to siphon off support from both the Communists and the DC III. Origins of Communist Strength	25X1
The Communists owe their pivotal position on the Italian political scene to historical and socio-economic factors.	
They established their credentials as patriots through their leading role in the underground resistance to Mussolini and the German occupation. Unlike the situation of the British or American Communists, they are not generally seen as the agents of an alien power.	
As the preeminent party of opposition, they have been able to establish themselves as the spokesman of the discontented and havenots in postwar Italy. Their supporters include industrial workers and unemployed or underemployed university graduates, as well as those repelled by the corruption of the Italian political system.	25X1
The Communists have made the most of these advantages through strong organization and good leadership.	25X1
They have buttressed their reputation as patriotic Italians by distancing themselves from the Soviets condemning, for example, Soviet abuses of human rights, the invasion of Czechoslovakia, and the military coup d'etat in Poland.	
They have established themselves as "democrats" and "responsible" participants in the political system rather than enemies of democracy by building a long record of responsible participation in Parliament and opposition to political terrorism.	25X1
IV. Changes in Italian Communism	
The evidence suggests that in addition to taking advantage of the system, the Italian Communists to some extent have been coopted by it.	
The public record indicates that there are no responsible leaders within the party who think seriously of establishing Communist rule or a one-party state in Italy.	25X1
Lingering hopes of this kind appear to have been dispelled by the fall of the	

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Allende government in Chile in 1973. Leaders drew the conclusion that there was no hope for a Communist government to survive in a Western country unless it was supported by an overwhelming majority of the population not a realistic possibility in Italy.
The evidence indicates in fact that the domestic political tactics of the Communists are not too dissimilar from those of the other Italian parties. Their major goal is to win representation in the government through the control of one or more ministries. They would hope to use this not only to pursue programmatic goals, but also as evidence of "respectability" to enhance their appeal at the polls.
Under the circumstances in which they would be likely to share in power as part of a multi-party coalition they would be compelled to behave like the other parties, compromising on one point to secure concessions on another.
V. <u>Communist Internal Problems</u>
Moreover, the successes of Italian communism have not come free of cost. Traditional Communist voters have not been able to accept the party's willingness to support centrist governments and austerity measures that hit workers the hardest.
Although the Communists held steady in the last elections, they have slipped more than 4 percentage points from the high reached in 1976.
The party's drift toward compromise with the "bourgeois" parties and its dropoff in the polls have strengthened a trend toward factionalism within the party leadership. At least five factions, ranging from old-line Stalinists to Social-Democrats can be identified.
Although the prominence of moderates in the party leadership makes the Communists more acceptable partners to the other Italian parties, their internal divisions also rob them of much of the organizational advantage they have enjoyed in the past.
VI. <u>Significance for the United States</u>
The relatively modest goals and internal problems of the Communists does not mean that their participation in government would be a matter of indifference to the United States. Although no puppets of the Soviet Union, few Italian Communist leaders are disposed toward friendship with the United States. There is little reason to doubt that once in government, they would attempt to nudge Italy in the direction of a more neutralist stance.

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